Mirrored By: www.siliconinvestigations.com www.siliconinvestigation, 920-955-3693 Side-Channel Monitoring of

Contactless Java Cards

by

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A thesis

presented to the University of Waterloo in fulfillment of the thesis requirement for the degree of Master of Applied Science

in

Electrical and Computer Engineering

Waterloo, Ontario, Canada, 2008

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I hereby declare that I am the sole author of this thesis. This is a true copy of the thesis, including any required final revisions, as accepted by my examiners.

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Abstract

Smart cards are small, portable, tamper-resistant computers used in securitysensitive applications ranging from identification and access control to payment systems. Side-channel attacks, which use clues from timing, power consumption, or even electromagnetic (EM) signals, can compromise the security of these devices and have been an active research area since 1996.

Newer "contactless" cards communicate using radio frequency (RF), without physical contact. These contactless smart cards are sometimes grouped with radio frequency identification (RFID) devices in popular usage of the term. This thesis investigates devices that use the ISO 14443 (proximity card) protocol, a large class of contactless/RFID devices.

Although contactless smart cards are increasingly common, very few reproducible practical attacks have been published. Presently, there are no known documented side-channel attacks against contactless Java Cards (open standard multi-application cards) using generic unmodified hardware.

This thesis develops a research-friendly platform for investigating side-channel attacks on ISO 14443 contactless smart cards. New techniques for measurement and analysis, as well as the first fully documented EM side-channel monitoring procedure, are presented for a contactless Java Card. These techniques use unmodified, commercial off-the-shelf hardware and are both practical and broadly applicable to a wide range of ISO 14443 devices, including many payment cards and electronic passports.

Acknowledgements

This research was financially supported by the Julie Payette-NSERC Research Scholarship, NSERC André Hamer Prize, as well as the University of Waterloo President's Graduate Scholarship.

I would like to thank my supervisor, Dr. Catherine Gebotys, for her support and encouragement and for her technical expertise in embedded systems side-channel attacks. I would also like to thank Brian White for helping me investigate smart card RF signals; his help with laboratory equipment and procedures proved invaluable.

I would also like to thank my parents, Fikret and Mina Berkes, for their support and encouragement throughout my research.

Contents

1	Intr	ntroduction 1			
	1.1	Contactless Smart Cards	2		
	1.2	Attacks	3		
	1.3	Contributions of Thesis	4		
	1.4	Organization of Thesis	5		
2	Bac	kground	7		
	2.1	Smart Cards	7		
	2.2	Java Cards	9		
	2.3	ISO 14443 Type A			
	2.4	Known Attacks			
	2.5	Smart Card Equipment	19		
		2.5.1 JCOP Cards with NXP Processors	19		
		2.5.2 Card Reader	21		
		2.5.3 Programming Environment	22		
3	Exp	xperimental Setup 2-			
	3.1	Methodology 2			
	3.2	Unique Challenges			

	3.3	EM Probe				
	3.4	Digital Oscilloscope				
	3.5	Finding Modulated Communications				
	3.6	ö Triggering				
		3.6.1 Triggering from LED	38			
		3.6.2 Triggering from EM	40			
	3.7	Test Harness on PC	43			
4	\mathbf{Exp}	periments	45			
	4.1	Base Case, Reference Applet (simple0)	48			
	4.2	Modified Command (simple0x) $\ldots \ldots \ldots \ldots \ldots \ldots \ldots \ldots$	52			
4.3 Modified Response (simple1)						
4.4 Random Number Generator (simple3)						
	4.5	One Round of Transformation (simple4)	57			
4.6 Two Rounds of Transformation (simple5)						
	4.7 Three Rounds of Transformation (simple6)					
	4.8	Summary of Experiments	61			
5	5 Discussion					
	5.1	Significance of Results	64			
	5.2	Timing Attack Implications	65			
	5.3	Comparison to Previous Research	67			
6	Con	clusion	70			
	6.1	Future Work	72			
\mathbf{A}	Java	va Card Applet Source Code 74				

List of Tables

4.1	Demodulated Command in simple0 Experiment	50
4.2	Demodulated Response in simple0 Experiment	52
4.3	Times, Communications Events in simple0 Experiment	52
4.4	Times, Communications Events in simple0x Experiment	53
4.5	Times, Communications Events in simple1 Experiment	54
4.6	Times, Communications Events in simple3 Experiment	56
4.7	Times, Communications Events in simple4 Experiment	58
4.8	Times, Communications Events in simple5 Experiment	59
4.9	Times, Communications Events in simple6 Experiment	61
4.10	Summary of Experiments and Gap Durations	62
5.1	Applet on Java Card and Corresponding Gap Duration	65

List of Figures

2.1	Command APDU Structure	8
2.2	Response APDU Structure	8
2.3	RF Modulated Data (From ISO 14443-2 [21]) $\ldots \ldots \ldots \ldots$	12
2.4	'Pause' in Reader-to-Card Communication (From ISO 14443-2 [21])	14
2.5	Decoding ISO 14443 Command (left) and Response (right) \ldots .	15
2.6	Antenna Beneath Contactless Card Surface	20
2.7	Close-Up of Smart Card Integrated Circuit	21
3.1	Activity of Microprocessor on Java Card	25
3.2	Contactless Java Card Execution Model	26
3.3	EM Probe Position, Side	30
3.4	Probe Far from IC	31
3.5	Probe Near IC	31
3.6	EM Probe Position, Top	32
3.7	Card Response, Load Modulation	33
3.8	Captured Frame of Modulated Data	36
3.9	Voltage at LED on Card Reader	39
3.10	LED Trigger, Capture 1	40
3.11	LED Trigger, Capture 2	40

3.12	Detail of EM Trigger Condition	42
3.13	ISO 14443A Modulated Data After EM Trigger	43
4.1	Configuration of Card Reader, Card, EM Probe for Experiments	46
4.2	EM Capture of Command Modulation, simple0	49
4.3	EM Capture of Response Modulation, simple0	51
5.1	Possible Relative Processing Time of Java Card Routines	66

Chapter 1

Introduction

Smart cards are an embedded systems technology that are becoming entrenched in the security-conscious computing and business landscape. The smart card is a small plastic card containing an embedded computer system (low-power microprocessor, RAM, ROM, EEPROM, and limited I/O). Secure tamper-resistant memory often protects sensitive information on the card, such as private keys for use in cryptographic communications [31]. When used in a bank or credit card, these keys are financial in nature. In GSM mobile phone Subscriber Identification Modules (SIM cards), the card securely stores the subscriber's private identification key used for authentication and identification on the network. In both the bank and SIM cards, the private key is never transmitted outside the card but only used for internal operations. Smart cards are not necessarily required by design to encrypt or otherwise protect communications. However, in practice smart cards regularly use cryptographic algorithms such as DES, DSA, and RSA.

A single serial communication interface is the card's only channel for external data exchange. The same terminal which provides the communication interface also typically provides power to the card, though a small number of cards have on-board power. The card only operates and executes instructions when powered, but is inactive otherwise. In the case of smart cards with electrical contacts, a cluster of electrical contacts provides the connections for power and serial data. The contactless cards, which are powered through an electromagnetic (EM) field, are described more fully below. Some hybrid or "dual-interface" cards support both electrical contacts and EM operation, giving the user choice of terminal and interface.

Smart cards adhere to a number of standards. ISO 7810 [22] defines common form factor dimensions. ISO 7816 [20] defines electrical contacts, electrical characteristics, and communication protocols. ISO 14443 [21] (proximity cards, within 10 cm distance) defines contactless power, modulation, encoding and data formats. While these standards define consistent card construction and low-level data interfaces, most card implementations, data formats and protocols are proprietary. A notable exception are Java Cards [5], which execute small applications (applets) based on a simplified Java language and environment. The Java Card specifications [35], along with Open Platform specifications [11] which often come along with compliant cards, provide developers a standard platform and environment.

1.1 Contactless Smart Cards

Contactless smart cards, which are the focus of this thesis, are a recent variant that provide an alternative to using electrical contacts to the outside world. The contactless smart cards contain an antenna wound into the plastic card (shown in Section 2.5.1), and are completely powered by the energy provided by the electromagnetic field of a nearby terminal or card reader [31]. Data is transmitted and received over the modulated radio frequency (RF) channel. The contactless cards no longer need any physical electrical contacts in order to operate.

While smart cards with contacts are still most prevalent, contactless cards are currently being widely deployed. Many banks now distribute contactless smart cards, some with a dual-contact interface for compatibility with contact terminals. New electronic passports also use the same ISO 14443 [21] contactless communication protocol, though they are sometimes described as Radio Frequency Identification (RFID) devices due to nomenclature inconsistency. The term RFID more commonly applies to non-cryptographic cards, supporting other ISO standards outside the scope of this thesis.

This thesis will focus on contactless smart cards which communicate using the ISO 14443 protocol. The procedures and findings should therefore be relevant and applicable to a very wide range of smart card-like devices which use this protocol, including payment cards and electronic passports.

1.2 Attacks

The new applications of contactless devices, notably in payment systems and passports, will undoubtedly attract attention from malicious parties of all kinds. For this reason, it is important to research the weaknesses of contactless systems so that vulnerabilities can be found and corrected.

Unlike contactless cards, attacks against contact smart cards are not new. Since Kocher's early findings on practical timing [25] and later power analysis [26], a large number of practical attacks have been published against various smart card implementations and algorithms. These "side-channel attacks" use extra information obtained through a side channel (time, power consumption, electromagnetic emissions), rather than the data channel. Among these attacks, the class of differential power analysis attacks [26] have proved to be particularly effective and difficult to protect against, and continue to be a major research area.

However, nearly all of these attacks have targeted smart cards with electrical contacts. When it comes to contactless smart cards, there has been surprisingly little published research on side-channel attacks. Even within current published research, there are few (if any) documented details on test and measurement procedures that can be used to repeat and confirm findings. This is largely due to the confidentiality of smart card documentation, absence of platforms suitable for academic research, and the current belief that proprietary knowledge or custom hardware is required to facilitate research [16]. When proprietary hardware or techniques are required, practical attacks can neither be properly described nor replicated by others. Attacks against researcher-designed or modified contactless cards are often a far cry from real world practical attacks.

The objective of this thesis is to develop research-friendly test techniques and contactless measurement methods that can be used with unmodified, commercial off-the-shelf equipment. The target device in this research is a commonly-used contactless Java Card which can be programmed according to an open specification. It is hoped that this research will open the door for further research into contactless smart card attacks, with less proprietary hurdles than encountered up to now.

1.3 Contributions of Thesis

In the public academic research realm, there appears to be a large, unexplored area of side-channel attacks against contactless smart cards despite ongoing smart card research since 1995. The challenge lies with the platform, environment and procedures used to explore attacks, which must be properly established in a nonproprietary way before sophisticated side-channel attacks can be carried out and repeated by others in the scientific community.

The contributions of this thesis include:

- Development of a research-friendly platform suitable for further academic research into attacks targeting contactless smart cards using ISO 14443. The platform and environment described in this thesis uses common technologies with public specifications (Java Card). The hardware used in the research is not custom, but readily available at low cost.
- Software for Java Cards that demonstrates basic attack scenarios
- New measurement techniques and lab procedures for the novel environment,

including procedures for passive eavesdropping on ISO 14443 (contactless) communications.

- EM-based measurements of code execution time on contactless Java Cards. The results show the feasibility of timing attacks on Java Card applets.
- For the first time, this research shows that it is possible to monitor the EM side-channel of a commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) contactless Java Card using a standard oscilloscope, without any card contact or custom hardware. The findings are applicable to any device using standard ISO 14443, such as modern payment cards and new electronic passports.

The target environment used in this thesis has not been investigated in previous contactless attack research. The protocols/standards and software used are well documented and accessible to other researchers without proprietary concerns. Along with fully documented test and measurement procedures, this thesis contributes a new way of researching attacks against contactless smart cards in the hope that other researchers can build upon the platform and techniques introduced for the first time here.

1.4 Organization of Thesis

Chapter 2 describes smart card systems including the specific contactless technology used in this research. This background section also describes the hardware and protocols used, as well as known attacks against these systems.

Chapter 3 describes methodology and lab preparations done before the main experiments, which were necessary to discover and manage the novel environment. While these experiments were preliminary and exploratory in nature, the findings are significant as there is very little published information on experimental setups and measurement techniques in this previously unexplored environment. Chapter 4 describes the main experiments which first validate the new measurement techniques, and then correlate side-channel timing data with computations on the smart cards. Chapter 5 discusses the experimental results and provides a comparison to existing knowledge in the field. Chapter 6 states the contributions of this thesis with respect to current state-of-the-art knowledge in the field and suggests future work.

Chapter 2

Background

2.1 Smart Cards

Smart cards are embedded systems built into a plastic card with a standard form factor, defined by ISO 7816 [20]. The smart card includes a low-power microprocessor, RAM, ROM, EEPROM and serial I/O (half-duplex) through either metal contacts or an antenna, in contactless operation. Typically, smart cards do not include a power source and are powered either through contacts or an electromagnetic field. A smart card operates when connected to a card acceptance device, which in this thesis will be called a **card reader** or **reader** for short.

Hardware implementations of smart cards vary considerably with vendor and microprocessor capabilities, as do programming models and software protocols. To provide some interoperability, ISO 7816 standardizes some aspects of smart cards, such as the external physical/electrical characteristics and the application-level protocol for data exchange.

Smart cards communicate using application protocol data units, or APDUs (defined in ISO 7816-4). These data packets take two forms: command APDUs sent from a reader to a card, and response APDUs sent from a card back to the reader. These packet formats are illustrated in Figure 2.1 and Figure 2.2, respectively [31].

The smart card operates in a master/slave model, always waiting for a command from the reader and returning a response to complete the exchange.

Mandatory header					Optional	l body
CLA	INS	P1	P2	Lc	Data	Le
Class	Instruction	Param1	Param2	Length	Data field	Response length

Figure 2.1: Command APDU Structure

Optional body	Mandatory trailer		
Data field of length Le	Status word (SW)		

Figure 2.2: Response APDU Structure

In the command APDU, the class byte (CLA) identifies applications and command sets, and the instruction byte (INS) encodes a specific instruction. The rest of the packet defines parameters and optional data. There are some standard CLA meanings, such as '8X' for private use/credit cards and 'A0' for GSM [31].

The response APDU consists of data with length Le (specified by the command) and a mandatory two-byte status word (or return code). There are several standard status words, for example 0x9000 to indicate successful execution of a command [31].

The transport protocol (ISO 7816-3 [20]) is one layer below APDU, and defines data block formats for physical transmission. Available modes are T=0 and T=1for contact operation. Contactless operation is called T=CL, but actually refers to ISO 14443 [21] (described in Section 2.3). Data at the transport layer is not encrypted, so smart card applications must encrypt communications at a higher layer.

2.2 Java Cards

Java Cards are multi-application smart cards based on open standards, to facilitate interoperability and reduce barriers to smart card software development. Smart cards have historically been proprietary in nature and code has not been portable; instructions written for one microprocessor could not work on another platform without modifications.

The Java Card platform [35] aims to support multiple applications on a card in a secure, portable environment offering many of the features of the Java programming language. Applications written for Java Card can be loaded onto cards from different vendors, largely independent of card hardware. Security features of Java Card such as the virtual machine, strict bounds checking, and the applet firewall aim to prevent security breaches due to programming flaws or malicious applications [5].

It is important to note, however, that the language used to program cards is not Java. Only a subset of Java features are supported by Java Card. The platform is, after all, designed for embedded systems limited by extremely low memory and power. Some of the major differences between regular Java language and Java Card include [5]:

- Only small primitive data types are supported. Typically, only 8 and 16-bit integers are available [34] (hardware-dependent).
- Only one-dimensional arrays are supported. There are no strings or multidimensional arrays.
- Threads are not supported, and many complex properties of objects are not available.

A Java Card application begins as a regular Java source file and is compiled into a class file (as with any other Java program). The Java Card converter, running on a PC, then converts this class file into a Converted Applet (CAP) file. This CAP file contains class information, executable byte code, linking and other information in a very compact format [5]. Although it is compact, this CAP file *does not* contain machine code which can be directly executed by the smart card microprocessor. Instead, the virtual machine on the smart card will interpret this data.

The CAP file format [35] is the standard binary format in Java Card technology. Once a smart card application is created and converted to CAP format, it can be loaded onto a variety of cards without much concern for underlying hardware. Section 2.5.3 describes how these CAP files are loaded onto physical smart cards used in this thesis.

Once the CAP file has been loaded into an actual smart card and installed, the Java Card Virtual Machine (JCVM) interprets byte code, controls memory, and executes microprocessor instructions. This virtual machine makes it possible to write one Java Card application that runs on a variety of physical platforms.

The Java Card Runtime Environment (JCRE), which can generally be described as the whole operating system (OS), consists of the virtual machine described above as well as other APIs and system facilities. The JCRE makes it possible for independently written applications to run on the embedded system by providing an abstract layer between application instructions and physical hardware.

Because smart cards are only externally powered when they are in use, the JCRE (and any applications running within it) has a rather unique life cycle. The JCRE is only initialized once during the card's lifetime. From then on, the virtual machine's state as well as the state of any applications on the card are stored in persistent memory, typically EEROM. Instances of applications, objects, and certain allocated arrays are all stored in persistent memory. When the card's power is removed or interrupted, the virtual machine is suspended. When the smart card is next powered up by connecting to a card reader, the virtual machine resumes operation and all objects resume from their stored state.

Java Card applications are known as **applets**. Because cards can support mul-

tiple applets, each applet instance is assigned a unique application identifier (AID). When a terminal wants to communicate with a specific applet, it sends the SELECT APDU command with the appropriate AID. From Figure 2.1, which shows the command APDU encoding, the SELECT command requires CLA=0x00, INS=0xA4, P1=0x04, P2=0x00 and the AID in the data field.

The JCRE routes the SELECT command and subsequent commands to the appropriate applet, initializing the applet if necessary. Once the applet is selected, commands will go to its process() method and the Java Card can be used just like any smart card in a master/slave model.

2.3 ISO 14443 Type A

ISO 14443 [21] defines specifications for a class of contactless integrated circuit cards ("proximity cards") which operate at a nominal distance of approximately 10 cm, as opposed to "close coupled" or "vicinity" cards which operate at different distances. ISO 14443 compliant cards may be called RFID cards or contactless smart cards, depending on microprocessor capabilities.

Contactless cards are related to the Near Field Communication (NFC) standard, operating in a passive mode and retrieving power from the RF field of a nearby card reader [14]. The powered reader generates a sinusoidal field with carrier $f_c =$ 13.56 MHz \pm 7 kHz, and supplies the card with operating energy. Both the reader and card contain a coupling coil (loop antenna) and communicate with each other by modulating the field. The reader and card are said to be inductively coupled, since the electromagnetic field wavelength is several times greater than the nominal card distance and the reader's field can be treated as purely magnetic [23].

The standard defines two different types of cards (Type A and Type B), depending on the type of modulation used. The standard uses the terms "proximity coupling device" (PCD) which means the card reader, and "proximity integrated circuit card" (PICC) which means the contactless card. Throughout this thesis, the simplified terms reader and card will be used, respectively.

Figure 2.3 from the ISO 14443 specification illustrates data modulation in both reader-to-card and card-to-reader communications. In this thesis, only Type A cards are studied because the JCOP cards (used for experiments) are all Type A [18]. The reader-to-card communications use 100% Amplitude Shift Keying (ASK) and a modified Miller code. For this communication, the reader switches the field on and off, and there is no carrier during the 'pause' periods (described later).

The card-to-reader communications use load modulation and employ On/Off Keying (OOK) with a Manchester code. In the load modulation scheme, the card switches an additional load into the field to draw more energy and generate a subcarrier $f_s = \frac{f_c}{16} \approx 847$ kHz. Because the card and reader are coupled across the air interface, the reader can sense when the card switches its load into the field. In Figure 2.3, this load modulation is represented by a partial reduction in amplitude, although load modulation can appear differently in physical measurements.



* Inversion of data is also possible

Figure 2.3: RF Modulated Data (From ISO 14443-2 [21])

In the modulation example shown in Figure 2.3, bit durations of $t=\frac{128}{f_c}$ are marked along with decoded bit values. To illustrate the demodulation scheme, consider each bit duration divided into two halves. The bit value will be determined by the RF state in these two halves.

In Type A reader-to-card modulation (top left of illustration), the possible states for the half-bits are regular carrier and 'pause', due to 100% ASK. The following rules are used to demodulate the signal for each bit duration:

- 'Pause' at the start of the bit duration indicates logic 0 if following 0, or the start of the communication
- Carrier in the first half-bit followed by a 'pause' indicates logic 1
- Carrier for the whole bit duration (both half-bits) indicates logic 0

Using the above rules, the reader-to-card RF in Figure 2.3 decodes as 01001.

In Type A card-to-reader modulation (bottom left of illustration), the possible states for the half-bits are regular carrier and loaded subcarrier, due to the card switching a load into the carrier (load modulation). The following rules are used to demodulate the signal for each bit duration:

- Carrier in the first half-bit followed by loaded subcarrier in the second half-bit indicates logic 0
- Loaded subcarrier in the first half-bit followed by carrier in the second half-bit indicates logic 1

Using the above rules, the card-to-reader RF in Figure 2.3 decodes as 01001.

The 100% ASK used in the reader-to-card communication is characterized by a pause in the carrier. Since the card is powered by this carrier, the pause must not be too long. Figure 2.4 shows the specifications for this pause.



Figure 2.4: 'Pause' in Reader-to-Card Communication (From ISO 14443-2 [21])

Figure 2.4 shows the envelope of the carrier as it is modulated with 100% ASK. The pause (t_1) refers to a drop below 90% amplitude of the carrier for a minimum of 2.0 μ s and maximum 3.0 μ s before resuming a level above 5% of the carrier amplitude.

These communications between the reader and the card are used both to transmit smart card APDU data packets, and ISO 14443 protocol-specific instructions. ISO 14443 includes anti-collision provisions, allowing up to 14 contactless cards to communicate with one reader. The start of a contactless card session begins with a reader activation sequence, involving an anti-collision loop and Answer To Select (ATS) exchange. During operation, the card reader also typically polls the card using a REQA instruction [12].

In this thesis, the terminology used to describe smart card communications will

be simplified in order to focus on APDU transmissions. For example, the term **command** will refer to a reader-to-card APDU communication (a request sent to the contactless smart card), and the **response** will be the card-to-reader APDU communication. The default data rate is 106 kbit/s and higher data rates may be supported by the equipment. All experiments in this thesis are conducted at the default data rate.

Figure 2.5 shows how ISO 14443 command and response communications can be visually demodulated. The plot shows a Type A card communication captured on a digital oscilloscope, using measurement techniques outlined in Section 3.4. The x-axis is time, showing 90 μ s of both the command (left) and response (right). The y-axis is the voltage from the amplified EM probe (peak 80 mV). The binary values above the RF waveform represent the data being transmitted, showing the start and end of each bit duration.



Figure 2.5: Decoding ISO 14443 Command (left) and Response (right)

The demodulation rules described earlier in this section can be applied to Fig-

ure 2.5 to decode the bits. In the command (left), 100% ASK brings the signal down near zero, forming a 'pause'. In the response (right), load modulation appears as 'bumps' above the carrier. The subcarrier is not clearly observable at this resolution, so this capture on real RF looks somewhat different than Figure 2.3. However, it is clear where load modulation occurs and this is sufficient to demodulate the signal according to the earlier rules. As before, the two half-bit states (aligned to the marked bit durations) are used to decode values.

The data bits are preceded by a starting marker, as described in the standard. The eight bits are then transmitted in Least Significant Bit (LSB) to Most Significant Bit (MSB) order, plus one parity bit. Reversing the bit order, the byte is found to be $0\ 0\ 0\ 1\ 0\ 1\ 1 = 0$ x0B.

In the experiments, this same visual demodulation technique is applied to whole data packets in order to read data values transmitted by software. This example from real-world communications shows that one can passively read the data bytes in an ISO 14443 communication once a signal has been acquired with sufficient resolution. Contactless smart cards must therefore encrypt data before transmitting, a task left to the application layer.

2.4 Known Attacks

Although the goal of this thesis is not to perform an attack on a cryptographic system, a quick review of known attacks in the field is included here to orient the reader to the current state of smart card attacks. The methods developed in this thesis are more meaningful when seen in the context of existing research.

Side-channel attacks are a type of embedded system attack that have gained much attention in recent years due to their potency and range of uses. Many, but not all, of the attacks described in this section are side-channel attacks.

The side-channel is an avenue for acquiring extra information relevant to conducting an attack, in one of several forms:

- Timing, from the execution time of software routines
- **Power**, from current flowing through on-card circuitry
- EM emanations, from current flowing through on-card circuitry causing electromagnetic fields

An attacker may be able to gain information from the side-channel and then use that information to assist an attack against a target device. For instance, the attacker may discover some bits of a key. Less direct but still dangerous, an attacker may learn some aspect of data transformations or computations on the device such as the state of a data bus or intermediate result.

Research into side-channel attacks began with Kocher's timing attacks, which revealed that careful measurements of computation time can, among other things, reveal Diffie-Hellman exponents and factor RSA keys [25]. A few years later, a method of analysing power consumption of a device to reveal DES secret keys was discovered [26]. "Differential Power Analysis" (DPA) was able to easily find secret keys from smart card power consumption and posed a serious threat to smart cards and other embedded system. To execute these attacks, direct contact is made to the smart card and signals can be easily acquired, unlike contactless cards.

These power attacks were based on the observation that power consumption of a device is mathematically related to the instructions and data being processed. Similarly, there are EM signals that emanate from an integrated circuit while it is performing computations. These EM signals are also related to the underlying computations and can be used to obtain the same results as power analysis, now using electromagnetic analysis (EMA) [30]. Further research showed that this EM sidechannel can reveal more information than the one-dimensional power side-channel, and might be used to attack cryptographic devices that employ countermeasures for power analysis [1]. Various attacks demonstrated differential EM analysis (DEMA) on smart cards and other embedded systems [8]. However, these attacks used special purpose hardware and were not performed on contactless cards or Java Cards. Contactless smart cards and RFID have recently attracted attention, as they are now being widely deployed. Researchers have demonstrated that the same EM attacks can work on contactless cards [3, 16], although there are very few published attacks. There have not been any EM attacks on contactless Java Cards or other complex multi-application cards. Some contactless cards, such as ISO 14443 [21] compliant devices, are also vulnerable to whole new categories of relay or manin-the-middle attacks [12, 13, 24]. Researchers have been developing new tools to demonstrate eavesdropping and other contactless threats [23, 2], which can even be used in practical attacks against new electronic passports [15]. Further details on how previous researchers synchronized signal acquisition with contactless smart cards are given in Section 3.6.

Java Cards are a relatively new type of multi-application smart card that are growing in popularity due to the ease of application development and platform compatibility. There have been some published attacks, such as using power analysis to reverse engineer applications [38] and theoretical fault attacks [7]. Some recent research describes methods that could be used to launch side-channel attacks [4].

There is ongoing research in our university lab relating to side-channel attacks and countermeasures. This thesis extends some of the lab techniques introduced by Tiu in her embedded systems side-channel attacks [37]. Gebotys and White have also developed refinements to DEMA that make the technique usable on more complex Java devices [10]. The devices investigated in this thesis are also Javabased and may share similar characteristics, from an EM attack perspective.

Because Java Cards and particularly contactless Java Cards are largely unexplored attack areas, this thesis sets out to discover and fully document techniques that could be used to monitor side-channels of Java Cards and other contactless cards.

2.5 Smart Card Equipment

The following is a quick overview of the smart card equipment used for this thesis. The specific smart card hardware, card reader, and software environment are introduced.

2.5.1 JCOP Cards with NXP Processors

The contactless cards used in this thesis are Java Card Open Platform (JCOP) cards [19], an IBM implementation of Java Card 2.1.1 [35] and Open Platform 2.0.1 [11]. The JCOP30 cards used in experiments feature a dual-interface, allowing both regular smart card protocols T=1 and T=0 as well as the contactless T=CL over ISO 14443A [21].

The JCOP30 card uses the Philips/NXP P8RF5016 integrated circuit [29] with IBM's proprietary Java Card operating system in ROM. There is 14 kB of EEPROM available for a persistent Java heap and applets, plus an additional 512 bytes of EEPROM for a transaction buffer. JCOP30 also offers 750 bytes of RAM for a transient Java heap, 261 bytes of RAM for the APDU buffer, and 200 bytes for the Java stack. A default Java Card OS from IBM is included in ROM, and an additional 20 kB of ROM are available for applications.

Many Java Card features are optional. JCOP30 implements garbage collection and some cryptographic algorithms (RSA, DES, SHA, MD5, key generation, random number generation). Some of these facilities are provided by the JCOP OS in ROM while others are hardware-assisted.

The Philips/NXP P8RF5016 integrated circuit is the heart of the dual-interface smart card. This IC includes an 8-bit low power 80C51 CPU with configurable clock speed. The IC includes triple-DES and FameX RSA co-processors, as well as a "true low power random number generator in hardware" [29].

The dual-interface smart card IC is buried underneath the plastic card's surface, and is connected both to the metal contact pads and to an antenna for RF operation. A colleague removed a thin layer of plastic from a discarded faulty card using a power router tool [32], revealing the loop antenna wound within the card near its edge, as shown in Figure 2.6.



Figure 2.6: Antenna Beneath Contactless Card Surface

With the layer of plastic scratched off the card surface, the integrated circuit is also visible. Figure 2.7 shows a close-up photograph of the IC, located at the same position as the metal contact square but on the reverse side. The wire connections to the contact pads on the reverse are visible, as are the wires connecting to the loop antenna at the left and right. However, experiments in this thesis did not require the removal of the IC, or any tampering of the smart card. All experiments were carried out with an unmodified, original contactless smart card. These figures are only shown for interest.



Figure 2.7: Close-Up of Smart Card Integrated Circuit

2.5.2 Card Reader

Smart cards that have no internal power source only operate together with a card reader, which powers and communicates with the card. The card reader used in the experiments is an Omnikey CardMan 5121 [27], an inexpensive dual-interface card reader that connects to a PC using USB. Software on the PC uses the PC/SC interface [28] to send and receive APDU packets to/from a card inserted into the card reader.

The card reader supports ISO 7816 [20] for contact operation using either T=0 or T=1 transport mode. For contactless smart cards and RFID, the reader supports ISO 14443 [21] Type A and Type B cards operating at 13.56 MHz. The reader supports up to 424 kbps data rate, but only default data rates are used in experiments.

Different card readers may implement ISO 7816 and ISO 14443 differently. Some of the observations in this thesis may therefore depend on the behaviour of this card reader.

2.5.3 Programming Environment

The Eclipse programming environment with the JCOP Tools plug-in [17] is used to program the cards and run experiments with applets. This development environment recognizes the card reader connected to the PC using the PC/SC interface. The Eclipse programming environment allows regular Java programming, and the JCOP Tools add additional libraries to support specific IBM JCOP smart cards.

The JCOP Tools also add a JCOP Shell, which can be used interactively to send packets to a connected card reader and a smart card, if present. This allows the programmer to directly communicate with the card reader and a smart card through a console, showing hexadecimal/ASCII packet dumps and response packets from the smart card.

The JCOP Shell has built-in support for the CardManager, which is an application that exists in the operating system of Open Platform/GlobalPlatform cards [11]. The CardManager runs on the smart card and oversees application management and optional secure layers. The JCOP Shell has some commands which invoke scripts specific to Open Platform or CardManager.

After the programmer creates a new smart card application and compiles it into a CAP file (see Section 2.2), the following steps are used to load the applet onto the smart card:

- 1. Open a JCOP Shell session to an attached PC/SC card reader
- 2. Use the **/terminal** command to poll the card reader and confirm that a card is present
- 3. Use the /card command to reset the inserted card, request the answer to reset (ATR), and select the CardManager application
- 4. Use the **auth** command to invoke an Open Platform script that authenticates, using the default key (the key on the JCOP cards was left as default)

- 5. Use the **upload** command with the CAP filename as a parameter to invoke an Open Platform script that uploads the CAP file and loads the package using CardManager
- 6. Use the **install** command with AID parameter(s) to invoke an Open Platform script to install the applet using CardManager. The AID will be used to identify the new applet instance.

Once the applet instance has been created, the applet is active and ready to receive commands. It still must be selected before use, as described in Section 2.2.

In summary, while smart cards adhere to basic standards, there is significant variation in card design and capabilities. The low-level protocols for smart card communication (ISO 7816 and ISO 14443) permit interoperability, but specifics such as application protocols and implementations vary considerably. Java Cards are a type of complex, multi-application smart card supporting a sophisticated OS and run-time environment with many components. The Java Card adds significant confidentiality due to OS security measures and hardware abstraction in the virtual machine. Thus, methods for conducting research and side-channel monitoring of such devices remain difficult with long learning curves. Previous attacks in the smart card field have not targeted contactless Java Cards. The next section develops an experimental setup for working with such smart cards.

Chapter 3

Experimental Setup

3.1 Methodology

This section introduces the methodology for the investigation into contactless Java Cards and the experiments in this thesis. A considerable amount of laboratory work is required to establish the basic methods and procedures for dealing with contactless Java Cards, since test and measurement procedures in this area have not previously been documented. The required preparations, such as probe configuration and oscilloscope triggering, are described in the following sections. The novel configuration of this test equipment and method for observing the side-channel is itself one of the thesis contributions. Section 4 then describes further experiments on the contactless Java Cards carried out after the test methods have been established.

This thesis aims to investigate the execution of Java Card applets on contactless smart cards from a side-channel perspective. See Section 2.4 for an introduction to these attacks. In this thesis, only unmodified smart cards are studied so the power analysis (from direct current flow) is ignored as a potential side-channel. Contactless smart cards do not draw power from external wires, and any points which carry measurable current flow are buried beneath the card's surface.

In order to study the side-channel, one has to first locate it. Attackers are

interested in the time period when a smart card's microprocessor is performing relevant computations. There are, after all, very large time spans during which the microprocessor is idle or possibly executing other instructions that are irrelevant to the attacker. The attacker must therefore capture the side-channel information during the appropriate time period, rather than during times when the smart card is idle, communicating, or performing other maintenance tasks.



Figure 3.1: Activity of Microprocessor on Java Card

To conduct a meaningful side-channel analysis, the attacker must capture sidechannel information precisely during the periods of interest as illustrated in Figure 3.1. For the time side-channel, the attacker measures the time duration of the microprocessor activity of interest. For the EM side-channel, the attacker measures the EM signals emanating from the device during microprocessor activity of interest.

While it is true that differential EM analysis can tolerate some amount of misalignment, the attacker must still align their side-channel data capture to some degree. After all, in real smart cards, the irrelevant periods as depicted can last from milliseconds to several seconds.

To conduct an attack and capture the side-channel information, the attacker needs a *trigger signal* which tells measurement equipment to begin acquiring samples. This trigger must align closely to the activity of interest to permit automatic capture of side-channel information.

In smart cards, the microprocessor activity of interest does not happen randomly of course. A smart card always communicates with a terminal or card reader in a master-slave model. The smart card waits for a command packet (an APDU as described in Section 2.1), performs computations, and returns a response packet (APDU). No matter what the smart card's microprocessor does while waiting for a command, it must perform the computations of interest after receiving a command. This execution model is depicted in Figure 3.2, which shows the master-slave communication in relation to microprocessor activity. For convenience, the dark area (microprocessor activity of interest) will be referred to as the "gap" between command and response packets in later analysis.



Figure 3.2: Contactless Java Card Execution Model

While previously documented side-channel attacks benefited from tight synchronization between the command/response communications and microprocessor activity, the timing is less predictable on contactless Java Cards. Section 3.2 describes these unique challenges for the environment. In these contactless cards, there are no data communication wires to help the attacker synchronize their data capture. The attacker must therefore use the RF signal in order to trigger and capture the side-channel at the correct time.

The following sections on setting up the test environment have an emphasis on locating RF communications for use in triggering. This will allow proper alignment of side-channel information capture with smart card microprocessor activity. Further experiments as described in Section 4 both validate and more finely investigate the execution model introduced by Figure 3.2.

3.2 Unique Challenges

The smart cards which have been previously attacked by researchers typically execute single code sequences and have a predictable execution sequence and timing. For instance, the typical cryptography-capable ISO 7816 [20] smart cards contain an 8 bit microprocessor and have one series of instructions (the program) which executes upon receiving an input data packet (the command). They immediately calculate the input and return a response packet.

For these conventional contact smart cards, setting up a side-channel attack is relatively straightforward: a host computer repeatedly sends different input messages to the smart card. Wires connected to the smart card's contacts let the attacker measure power consumption, and direct access to the serial data contact lets the attacker begin measurement of power or EM exactly when new data has been sent. In this well-studied scenario, the attacker knows exactly when the code of interest is executed.

Code execution on the Java Card is more complicated, as this is a multiapplication card. The contactless interface adds additional complications which are described later. The Java Card operating system has a number of abstract layers which provide interfaces between the high-level "applet" and the low-level processor instructions. Notably, the Java Card Runtime Environment (JCRE) selects among several applets, routes incoming commands, manages objects and memory, and does
garbage collection. (The JCOP30 cards used for this thesis have garbage collection [19], others may not.) The JCRE automatically moves data to/from EEPROM as necessary for persistent objects. The Virtual Machine (VM) interprets byte code from the converted applet or CAP file.

The Java Card operating system therefore significantly complicates basic instruction execution, although ultimately of course simple instructions are executed by the microprocessor. In this kind of system, it is not clear exactly which CPU instructions are executed at which times due to lack of explicit instruction sequence control.

Hardware implementation details of the specific Java Card OS used (IBM's JCOP) are unknown, as the only available documentation is a JCOP family description [18], JCOP card technical brief [19], and JCOP user guide and programming reference [17]. The lack of low-level documentation is likely due to the security nature of the device and the design goal of Java Card to isolate the programmer from hardware details. In fact, so few technical details are available that many programmers use developer forums to learn details that are not available in public documentation [34].

Even without implementation details, it is reasonable to assume that the various "background" operations in the Java Card OS (JCRE) lead to some unpredictability in program execution. There may be operating system operations happening at unpredictable intervals, which is very different from the regular single-application smart cards. Part of this thesis aims to evaluate the actual variation in execution times on this specific JCOP platform.

The above complications arise from the Java-related abstraction layers and runtime environment. The other major complication, in the context of setting up a side-channel attack, comes from the purely wireless interface between the terminal and the card. Unlike the contact cards where a wire carries the data directly, the contactless cards (including the Java Cards used in this thesis) communicate over an RF link. The ISO 14443 [21] protocol spoken by the card and reader includes channel negotiation, data modulation, error recovery and other wireless link provisions.

When a contactless card is placed near the reader and an RF link is established between the terminal and the card, packets of data can be transmitted and received. Some of these transmissions are for establishing the channel, some are idle chatter to maintain the channel (for example REQA in ISO 14443-3 [21]) and others are of course the modulated command and response packets of interest. The card reader's firmware dictates the nuances of this behaviour, making it difficult to ascertain when actual data and not other protocol instructions are being transmitted. Add to the picture the necessary transmit and receive buffers, and delays that come with a USB interface to a PC terminal, and clearly it is difficult to detect exactly when data is sent to the card.

Given these factors, the environment is particularly challenging to work with. There is much potential for unpredictable timing and synchronization. The data channel is littered with protocol communications which are largely irrelevant to the data being sent to and from the applet on the card. A vital part of setting up a side-channel attack is being able to synchronize the data acquisition from the side-channel (for example, EM antenna voltage) with the start of processing (for example, one encryption event). Most prior research for contactless cards have used custom hardware of some form to provide a special synchronization signal, undoubtedly because this synchronization of the contactless scenario is particularly difficult to achieve.

In the experiments described in this thesis, new synchronization techniques are attempted without the aid of custom hardware. The common card reader and contactless card are left unmodified as they would be in a real-world attack.

3.3 EM Probe

Contactless smart cards are near field communication devices, and an antenna placed in the field measures the superposition of both the modulated communication and any side-channel emanating from the device's microprocessor(s). This allows passive observation of the communication channel and any side-channel emanating from the microprocessors on the contactless device. A near field EM probe by Electro-Metrics Inc. (Model EM-6992) connected to a pre-amplifier with typical gain of 22 dB provides the input signal to the digital oscilloscope. The probe's 1 cm loop antenna is sensitive to H-field frequencies from below 100 kHz to 1 GHz. The signal from the probe is connected with a 50 Ω coaxial cable and the oscilloscope (see Section 3.4) is configured for matching termination. See [37] and [6] for more details on the probe and amplifier.



Figure 3.3: EM Probe Position, Side

While the goal of this research is to set the stage for future side-channel analysis, this thesis does not consider side-channel EM measurements emanating from contactless device microprocessors. The antenna used in these experiments is appropriate for measuring near field RF signals on the 13.56 MHz modulated data channel. Considering that the side-channel emanating from the contactless device is far weaker than this externally powered communication field, it is important that antennas used to measure the actual device side-channel are carefully selected and positioned for maximum sensitivity.

For instance, the loop antenna is best positioned parallel to the chip surface for H-field measurements [3]. Figure 3.3 shows how the probe is positioned in the lab.



Figure 3.4: Probe Far from IC

Figure 3.5: Probe Near IC

When observing the contactless field carrier signal at high resolution, the effect of the EM probe position is very visible. Figure 3.4 and Figure 3.5 show the same carrier signal picked up by the EM probe in the field of a reader communicating with a card, from two different positions. Each horizontal time division is 40 ns and the oscilloscope sampling rate is 10 GS/s (resolution of 0.1 ns). Figure 3.4 shows the carrier measurement when the EM probe is positioned far from the metal contacts of the smart card. Figure 3.5 shows the carrier when the EM probe is positioned near the contacts, flat against the reverse side of the card. The two figures show that there is a difference in the carrier measurement at the two different locations.

The exposed card in Section 2.5.1 shows that the smart card IC is located on the reverse side of the metal contacts. Because the contactless card draws its power from the carrier, this observation of the change in the carrier is potentially very interesting as it may show an EM side-channel from the IC. Further investigation is required to determine what is causing this effect, but the required signal analysis is outside the scope of this thesis.



Figure 3.6: EM Probe Position, Top

The antenna position is also important for measurements of the contactless device's response communications. ISO 14443 [21] defines different modulation schemes for the command and response communications. While the commands sent from reader to card are modulated with easily observable 100% ASK, the responses from the card back to the reader are load modulated (see Section 2.3). The load modulation is weaker and more difficult to see, and it was found through trial and error that best measurements are obtained when the loop antenna is positioned near the edge of the smart card as shown in Figure 3.6.

Previous exploration of the smart cards used in this thesis (see Section 2.5.1) showed that the antenna is close to the edge of the card. Therefore, the response modulation is best observed when the EM probe's loop antenna is placed near this card edge with the antenna winding, as seen at the right hand side of the exposed card in Figure 2.6. For the remainder of the experiments, the loop antenna is positioned parallel to the both the smart card and the card reader, approximately 1.0 cm above the card surface and approximately 2.5 cm above the card reader's PCB surface. The centre of the probe is located on the edge of the card. Figure 3.3 and 3.6 show both dimensions of this position.

With the probe positioned in this way, the weaker response modulation becomes easily observable. Figure 3.7 shows a card response over 40 μ s (4 μ s per division). The load modulation and subcarrier described in Section 2.3 are visible.



Figure 3.7: Card Response, Load Modulation

3.4 Digital Oscilloscope

The primary measurement equipment used in this thesis is a Tektronix TDS7254 digital oscilloscope. Details of the equipment's capabilities and operation can be found in the product manual [36]. This oscilloscope, with large data storage capacity, captures and records EM signals and other inputs. The oscilloscope features up to 6 GHz bandwidth and 20 GS/s sampling rate. The ISO 14443 carrier is $f_c = 13.56$ MHz \pm 7 kHz [21] and although the EM side-channel was not measured in this thesis, the bandwidth of the oscilloscope is more than enough to capture the required signal frequencies [1]. For the purpose of this thesis, measurements are carried out with a sampling rate of 1.25 GS/s (equivalent to a resolution of 800 ps).

Real-time data acquisition is performed in regular "sample" mode (as opposed to peak detect, average, or other modes). The amplified EM signal from the antenna is connected to the oscilloscope with a 50 Ω termination. This input has an amplitude < 200 mV, so the scope's vertical axis is configured for either 50 mV or 100 mV per division. The horizontal axis scale is adjusted according to the aspect of the RF desired for observation. A time scale of 40 ns per division allows one to easily observe the $T = \frac{1}{13.56 \text{ MHz}} = 74 \text{ ns carrier period.}$

Instead of single carrier periods, it is generally more useful to see subcarrier envelopes. For these observations, a time scale of 1 to 5 μ s per division allows one to see the modulation envelope. This corresponds to the ISO 14443 subcarrier of $f_s = \frac{f_c}{16} \approx 847$ kHz (with period ~ 1 μ s). In order to observe modulated data bits, which is the most useful observation for demodulation and data packet analysis, a time scale of 20 or 40 μ s per division is chosen. In this range, the oscilloscope clearly shows modulated data bits. While these time scales were adjusted through later experiments, the acquisition sample size was also adjusted in order to maintain a 1.25 GS/s sampling rate.

3.5 Finding Modulated Communications

With the probe positioned for best effect and the oscilloscope configured appropriately for viewing ISO 14443 [21] communications, it is now necessary to locate modulated data in order to refine the test and measurement techniques needed for further testing.

As a starting point, the digital oscilloscope is configured for a simple rising edge trigger at 0 V with a 250 ms hold-off period before the next trigger. With the digital oscilloscope continually showing captured data (at 250 ms intervals), the contactless smart card is inserted into the card reader's field. The presence of the card causes a back and forth initialization communication as per ISO 14443-3. This communication includes both short command and response packets being sent over RF.

Because no technique has yet been established to specifically capture these communications, the digital oscilloscope's "fast frame" acquisition mode is used as a search tool. Fast frame mode starts capturing many records into memory so that each record can be individually viewed later, as if it was a separate acquisition. Fast frame acquisition is started and then the contactless smart card is manually inserted into the card reader's field. Each captured frame (of 250 ms width) is then manually observed from oscilloscope memory, until something other than unmodulated 13.56 MHz carrier is observed.

This technique gives the first view of modulated data and whole data packets. Figure 3.8 shows one such captured frame, plotted from the oscilloscope's frame memory. The main display shows the 100% ASK modulation (card reader to card) and the top display shows a wider view of this modulation, showing whole data bits. Having obtained this view of actual modulated data, more refined triggering techniques can now be developed.



Figure 3.8: Captured Frame of Modulated Data

3.6 Triggering

Since modulated data can appear on the RF channel at unpredictable times (see Section 3.2), it is vital that a reliable trigger signal is available to capture data packets and side-channel at appropriate times. If the RF data is captured at the wrong time, the measurement may just show an unmodulated carrier or improperly aligned data capture, making side-channel analysis difficult or impossible. Because each smart card communication consists of a command and response pair, the digital oscilloscope would ideally be triggered at the instant data is sent over the RF channel. This form of data capture offers the most complete side-channel information, since the experimenter can observe the smart card transaction from start through to end.

The ideal "trigger" is a digital signal acting as a start marker, rising from low to high or high to low at the instant a command is sent. The trigger can be derived from several different points in the smart card system:

1. Software on the PC terminal. The PC sends a command instruction to the USB-connected card reader. There are operating system, interrupt and buffer delays here so no attempt is made to trigger at this stage.

- 2. Physical transceiver on the card reader. Once data to send is buffered at the USB card reader, the ISO 14443 [21] transceiver on the smart card reader sends the modulated data over RF. It is possible to directly observe the transceiver IC's antenna connection or digital send signal wire. This requires physical access to the card reader, in order to connect wires to the transceiver. Some researchers [3] have monitored the card reader's antenna signal as part of a contactless key-breaking attack. Others [12, 23] describe custom hardware built to handle ISO 14443 signals, which obviously gives the researcher most complete control with direct access to all relevant digital signals.
- 3. Physical transceiver on the smart card. The modulated data is received by the transceiver on the smart card. Unlike the transceiver on the card reader, it is not feasible to gain physical access to this transceiver located within the smart card, unless the card is modified or custom built. Some researchers [16] have used a custom prototype card which has an output pin on the microcontroller that pulls high to trigger, but custom cards are not used in this thesis.
- 4. Software on the smart card. After the smart card's hardware and operating system demodulates and decodes the RF data, it activates the software routine (applet) responsible for handling the command. The microprocessor starts executing instructions that process the input command. This would be the most accurate point to trigger external side-channel measurements. If the smart card were to support some external I/O channel for communicating a trigger signal, it could be controlled from within the applet software. Chaumette and Sauveron [4] describe a technique using facilities available on Java Cards to "glitch" or externally mark events. Some of these glitch techniques are not available on the JCOP cards used in this thesis, and others which are possible offer no particular timing accuracy due to OS overhead.

For other Java Card implementations, the glitch techniques may provide a useful triggering source.

5. Physical EM field. No matter what physical access to transceivers or software facilities are available, ultimately the command and response data is transmitted through the air and can be readily observed. Instead of relying on triggering signals obtained from modified hardware and software, a trigger derived from observation of ISO 14443 RF signals may provide the most generic triggering. The signal obtained through the air is virtually the same as the signal measured from a card reader antenna output, so this physical EM approach may be functionally equivalent to an earlier method based on monitoring the transceiver on the card reader [3]. However, that research does not describe measurement specifics. There are no other known instances of contactless triggering from the physical EM field.

For this thesis, triggering is first attempted from the physical transceiver on the card reader. Further testing is performed using triggering derived from the physical electromagnetic field, which is found to give superior results as described below. Various techniques are attempted through trial and error, with the assistance of a colleague who is familiar with the oscilloscope's capabilities and EM probe [39].

3.6.1 Triggering from LED

The smart card reader used in this thesis is a commercial off-the-shelf standalone unit as described in Section 2.5.2. While physical access to the card reader's printed circuit board (PCB) was easy to obtain, detailed product specifications were not available. Without the use of proprietary data sheets, the pin out of the RF transceiver integrated circuit was not available. However, two light emitting diodes (LEDs) in the card reader were connected to the transceiver and preliminary experiments showed that the LEDs blinked when data was sent and received via RF. It was presumed that these represent Tx and Rx LEDs, common in communication transceivers. Previous side-channel attacks on embedded systems by Tiu [37] used LEDs as a digital source for oscilloscope triggering, so a similar approach was first attempted with the smart card reader.

To investigate use of the LED for acquisition, a pair of wires are soldered to the card reader's PCB to probe the voltage across the LED. These wires are connected to the digital oscilloscope's input channel and the channel is observed while the LED blinks. The sampled voltage is found to be not a clean digital transition, but rather an oscillating signal. When the LED blinks, the voltage increases from 0 V to approximately 8 V as shown in Figure 3.9.



Figure 3.9: Voltage at LED on Card Reader

To attempt using this as a trigger source, a simple trigger is created from the input channel using noise reject mode coupling and a rising edge trigger at 1.0 V. The terminal, which controls the card reader, is programmed to send a command every 4 seconds, and the digital oscilloscope triggers every 4 seconds as expected.

While initial observations were encouraging, a number of problems appear with the LED-based triggering. The nature of the trigger signal varies between trials, with signal oscillation varying in amplitude, duration, and DC offset. Despite adjusting rising edge thresholds, a reliable rising edge configuration can not be obtained. Some command transmissions are missed entirely, and other times there is false triggering. More serious problems emerge when the antenna signal is plotted alongside the LED trigger signal. The antenna is placed in the card reader's field and shows the ISO 14443 [21] carrier and modulated data. For the LED-based trigger to have any use, it must correspond precisely to a consistent point of the RF communication (for instance, the start of the command transmission). Instead, observations reveal that the LED voltage's zero crossing corresponds to changing arbitrary points along the data transmission. Figures 3.10 and 3.11 show two different LED-triggered captures, demonstrating inconsistent alignment with modulated RF.





Figure 3.10: LED Trigger, Capture 1 Figure 3.11: LED Trigger, Capture 2

On the PC side (terminal), the automated command transmission software includes Java sleep instructions to add delays between successive sends. When the sleep instructions are present, the LED based trigger becomes completely unusable due to seemingly random correlation to actual data transmission. Given these numerous problems, the LED trigger approach is abandoned.

3.6.2 Triggering from EM

Triggering form the LED gave unsatisfactory results, so the physical electromagnetic field is next considered as a trigger source. For this approach, a technique specific to ISO 14443 Type A [21] is developed. The 13.56 MHz carrier is always present in the field, as it is needed to continually provide power to the contactless device. This carrier is modulated only when data is being sent across the channel, and command data packets are always sent first in the command/response communication sequence. Therefore, observing the first instance of data modulation after a period of unmodulated carrier indicates the start of a command and therefore the start of a command/response sequence. The smart card also begins its computations some time after the command transmission begins and some time before the response transmission ends. The start of the command transmission is therefore a very useful point at which to trigger side-channel data capture.

Part 2 of the ISO 14443 standard indicates that data communication from the card reader to the contactless device starts with a "sequence Z" which consists of a "pause" at the beginning of a bit duration. This provides a very convenient condition on which to trigger, because the first "pause" after a long string of unmodulated carrier indicates the very start of a new command transmission. The "pause" refers to a drop below 90% amplitude of the carrier for a minimum of 2.0 μ s and maximum 3.0 μ s before resuming a level above 5% of the carrier amplitude, as illustrated in Section 2.3.

The digital oscilloscope used in the lab supports a "time-out" triggering mode which can watch for this "pause" condition [39, 36]. The digital oscilloscope is configured to trigger when the input signal remains below 50 mV for 2 μ s. The hold-off period, during which triggers are ignored, is set to 4 ms for the tests which are conducted over a total time of approximately 4 ms. This effectively locates the first "pause" and therefore the start of the first command transmission.

Figure 3.12 shows pre-trigger on the left of the origin and post-trigger on the right. The cursor position at $t = -2.0 \ \mu s$ shows the point at which the RF signal drops below 50 mV for the first time. At t = 0, the time-out is reached and the oscilloscope triggers. This process very closely approximates the "pause" condition in ISO 14443-2, illustrated earlier in Figure 2.4.

With this newly configured trigger, the same trials are performed as with the LED trigger. The terminal is programmed to repeatedly send the same command to the contactless device with varying delays between each transmission. The cor-



Figure 3.12: Detail of EM Trigger Condition

responding data packets are successfully observed on the oscilloscope, indicating that this triggering method is indeed usable.

Figure 3.13 shows a typical command packet transmission observed with the new trigger. A notable aspect of these captures is that modulated data bits are clearly observable, and also appear exactly at the same point in subsequent captures. This suggests that the EM-based trigger is reliable and appropriate for further side-channel analysis.

One difficulty encountered with this method is the sensitivity to the "hold-off" parameter of the trigger definition. Since triggers are ignored during the hold-off period, the hold-off must be adjusted according to the expected time duration of the whole command/response sequence. If the hold-off period is shorter than the duration of the entire command/response exchange, then the oscilloscope would incorrectly trigger before the start of the next command. If the hold-off period is



Figure 3.13: ISO 14443A Modulated Data After EM Trigger

much longer than the duration of the entire command/response exchange, the start of the next command may be missed.

3.7 Test Harness on PC

In these preliminary experiments, the smart card reader was manually controlled. In order to simplify further testing, a test harness is required on the PC side. A test harness is a software tool used to automate testing of hardware/software by subjecting it to different tests and monitoring the results for errors or failures. The experiments in this thesis require repeated tests on several different smart card conditions and must be automated, so a test harness will oversee the tests.

The smart card reader (see Section 2.5.2) is connected to a standard PC through the PC/SC interface. The PC runs standard Java programs that make use of JCOP off-card API calls [17] to communicate with the connected card reader and smart cards which have been inserted, including contactless cards. For this thesis, the smart cards will be running simple software that responds to single incoming commands (Java code is given in Appendix A). The software running on the PC has to send the appropriately formed command through the card reader, and receive the response back from the smart card. The communications are captured on the oscilloscope during this command/response transaction. The software running on the PC performs this sequence of operations through the JCOP Shell (described in Section 2.5.3).

- 1. Connect to the card reader and ensure a card is inserted (sensed via RF)
- 2. Send the SELECT instruction to enable the Java Card applet required for the tests. This causes a one-time communication with the smart card.
- 3. Enter an infinite loop, sending command packets and checking for proper response packets from the smart card. During this stage, the software on the PC is communicating (over the contactless interface) with the software loaded onto the Java Card. The oscilloscope triggers and captures these command/response communications.

The test harness remains the same through the remaining experiments. Only minor modifications (such as different application identifier codes) are changed between tests.

Chapter 4

Experiments

This section investigates Java Card applets executing on contactless smart cards. A number of Java Card applets are created and loaded onto a physical JCOP card for a series of experiments on code execution. Each applet is a slight variation of a base case, **simple0**. The test harness developed in Section 3.7 runs on the PC to control the terminal, and communicates over a contactless interface with the applet loaded on the smart card. RF communications are captured using the EM probe triggering technique developed in Section 3.6.

For these experiments, the JCOP30 contactless Java Card is placed on top of the USB-connected Omnikey CardMan 5121 card reader. The EM probe with the attached 1 cm loop antenna is placed at the edge of the smart card. A rigid apparatus keeps the card reader, card, and antenna held in place for the duration of the measurements. Figure 4.1 shows the lab setup used for all contactless card experiments. See the figures in Section 3.3 for more details on relative position of devices.

The antenna is connected through an amplifier to the digital oscilloscope. See Section 3.4 for details on the oscilloscope configuration. While the test harness on the PC runs in a continuous loop, the smart card repeatedly answers commands sent from the PC through the card reader using RF. Those communications are captured and analysed.



Figure 4.1: Configuration of Card Reader, Card, EM Probe for Experiments

The oscilloscope is set to trigger in normal mode, so that the previously captured waveform is frozen on the display until a new trigger condition is satisfied. As the test harness causes continuous command packets to be sent, the display of the oscilloscope updates with each new trial. While observing these trial-to-trial captures, RF signals are seen to appear at the exact same time in each trial of the experiment. The tables in the following experiments show time measurements which are constant (not average). The one case where times shift and vary between trials is noted in Section 4.4. Overview of experiments (simple2 was renamed to simple0x)

- simple0 (Section 4.1) Base case applet. A command packet is sent to the card, and the applet returns a magic value in a short response packet. *Results show*: demodulation of captured RF confirms expected data, validating the EM triggering method of data packets developed in Section 3.6.
- simple0x (Section 4.2) Same applet software as simple0. A different command packet is sent, the same on-card processing occurs, and the applet returns the same response. *Results show*: RF of the captured command packet changes, but all other timing remains the same. Confirms correct observation of command packets and unchanged execution time for unchanged on-card code.
- simple1 (Section 4.3) Same applet software as simple0. The same command packet is sent, the same on-card processing occurs, but the applet returns a different response. *Results show*: RF of the captured response packet changes, but all other timing remains the same. Confirms correct observation of response packets and unchanged execution time.
- simple3 (Section 4.4) Applet software is modified to generate a random number before sending response. The same command and response packets are transmitted as simple0. *Results show*: RF of the command and response packets are unchanged, but the response comes after a large time delay. Confirms that extra processing time on the card shows as time delay before response, validating the processing model from Section 3.1.
- simple4 (Section 4.5) The applet software now does one round of a mathematical transformation. The same command and response packets are transmitted as simple0. *Results show*: RF of the command and response packets are unchanged, but there is now a longer time delay while the longer applet executes.

- simple5 (Section 4.6) The same applet software as simple4 now does two rounds of the mathematical transformation. The same command and response packets are transmitted. *Results show*: RF of the command and response packets are unchanged, but the response comes after a further time delay. This demonstrates that small changes in code execution show as small extra time delays on the side-channel.
- simple6 (Section 4.7) The same applet software as simple4 now does three rounds of the mathematical transformation. The same command and response packets are transmitted. *Results show*: RF of the command and response packets are unchanged, but the response is further time shifted by the same increment as when the last iteration was added. This demonstrates that each extra round of mathematical transformation adds a uniform amount of extra time, strongly suggesting vulnerability to a timing side-channel attack.

Taken together, the results of these experiments confirm the timing and communication model from Section 3.1, which suggest a correct and usable methodology for investigation into the side-channel of contactless Java Cards. The results from **simple4**, **simple5**, **simple6** also suggest the feasibility of timing side-channel attacks on contactless Java Cards purely through EM observation, as discussed in Section 5.2.

4.1 Base Case, Reference Applet (simple0)

This is the base case, and other experiments compare timing and data to this reference. In this experiment, the terminal sends a short command, the VERIFY (INS=0x20) instruction with blank parameters.

00 20 00 00 00

Upon receiving this command, the applet on the smart card immediately returns the magic value 0x2007 as a response. Other than this message handling, no other processing is done within the applet. (The Java Card OS may execute other instructions too but this is beyond the applet's control.) Using the test methodology developed in Section 3, the RF communications are captured using the EM probe while the terminal communicates with the applet. The ISO 14443 [21] communication is then demodulated as shown in Section 2.3.



Figure 4.2: EM Capture of Command Modulation, simple0

Figure 4.2 shows the first part of the EM capture, the modulated command. This RF signal is known to be the command sent from the terminal to the contactless card due to the type of modulation used. Table 4.1 then shows the demodulated bytes as read from this EM capture.

It is found that the packet header byte changes, alternating between 0x0A and 0x0B each time the command is sent by the terminal. This behaviour is observed

throughout all experiments in this thesis and appears to be a function of the card reader's implementation of the the T=CL transmission protocol for contactless communication, as described in part 4 of ISO 14443. Since the header alternates on each transmission, and is identical in command and response, the varying header is not explicitly mentioned in future discussions. Omitting this transport layer header, the body of the packet is APDU protocol bytes, as described in Section 2.1.

Data Bits	Hexadecimal	Meaning
0000 1011 (alternates)	0x0B or 0x0A	T=CL packet header
0000 0001	0x01	T=CL packet header
0000 0000	0x00	APDU 'CLA' (class)
0010 0000	0x20	APDU 'INS' (instruction)
0000 0000	0x00	APDU 'P1' (parameter 1)
0000 0000	0x00	APDU 'P2' (parameter 2)
0000 0000	0x00	APDU 'Lc' (length of data)
1101 1101 (changes)	0xDD	Error correction code
0111 1010 (changes)	0x7A	Error correction code

Table 4.1: Demodulated Command in **simple0** Experiment

Figure 4.3 shows the continuation of this EM capture, the modulated response, after approximately 2 ms of unmodulated carrier. This response RF signal uses load modulation because the data is sent from the contactless card back to the terminal. Table 4.2 shows the demodulated bytes corresponding to this response portion of the communication. The changing T=CL packet header corresponds to the number received in the command header.

Table 4.3 summarizes the distinct parts of the RF communication: the command, unmodulated carrier, and then response. The time and duration of these events will be compared to results from other experiments.



Figure 4.3: EM Capture of Response Modulation, simple0

To summarize the results of this experiment,

- The demodulated data bytes show that the observed RF does indeed represent the command and response as transmitted within software.
- The command and response transmissions have $\sim 700 800 \ \mu s$ duration, with a longer $\sim 2000 \ \mu s$ delay in between the two modulated transmissions.
- The data bytes are the expected values. These same results are seen on every trial of this experiment.
- The observations validate the EM triggering method for capturing data packet communications as developed in Section 3.6. The observations match the software behaviour and the expected communications.

Data Bits	Hexadecimal	Meaning
0000 1011 (alternates)	0x0B or 0x0A	T=CL packet header
0000 0001	0x01	T=CL packet header
0010 0000	0x20	Byte 1 of 0x2007 response
0000 0111	0x07	Byte 2 of 0x2007 response
1001 0000	0x90	Byte 1 of 0x9000 success code
0000 0000	0x00	Byte 2 of 0x9000 success code
1101 1001 (changes)	0xD9	Error correction code
0000 1011 (changes)	0x0B	Error correction code

Table 4.2: Demodulated Response in **simple0** Experiment

Interval	Δt	RF Observation
0.00 ms - 0.78 ms	$0.78 \mathrm{\ ms}$	Command, terminal-to-card
0.78 ms - 2.72 ms	$1.94 \mathrm{\ ms}$	Unmodulated carrier, no data
2.72 ms - 3.41 ms	$0.69 \mathrm{ms}$	Response, card-to-terminal
3.41 ms -		Unmodulated carrier, no data

Table 4.3: Times, Communications Events in simple0 Experiment

4.2 Modified Command (simple0x)

The **simple0x** experiment runs the same applet as **simple0**, but with a different command. The original command of:

 $00 \ 20 \ 00 \ 00 \ 00$

Is replaced with

00 20 FF 00 00

This is the same VERIFY (INS=0x20) instruction, but with 0xFF in the pa-

rameter. The applet ignores the specific parameter and returns the same response code (0x2007). The expectation is to see identical RF to the base case except for a modified command packet.

Interval	Δt	RF Observation
0.00 ms - 0.78 ms	$0.78 \mathrm{\ ms}$	Command, terminal-to-card
0.78 ms - 2.72 ms	1.94 ms	Unmodulated carrier, no data
2.72 ms - 3.41 ms	0.69 ms	Response, card-to-terminal
3.41 ms -		Unmodulated carrier, no data

Table 4.4: Times, Communications Events in simple0x Experiment

Table 4.4 summarizes the timing of communications in this experiment. To summarize the results:

- The command and response data are transmitted at the exact same times as **simple0** and have the same duration.
- Comparison of the modulated RF shows that the *command is different*, while the response is the same. (This difference is seen as different bit encodings corresponding to the modified parameter byte in the command as sent by the terminal.)
- This is expected, as only the command has been changed, with everything else remaining the same as the base case.
- These results confirm correct observation of command packets, using the capture technique developed. Indeed, as the command sent by the terminal changes, the same change appears in the captured RF with everything else being identical.

• The results also show no change in times of communication events when there has been no change in applet code. This suggests static communication event timing for a fixed applet program (CAP file). This static timing is observed on all trials, since oscilloscope plots of RF signals do not shift in time between acquisitions.

4.3 Modified Response (simple1)

The **simple1** experiment sends the same command and uses the same applet code as the base case. However, the applet now returns the magic value 0x2008 instead of 0x2007. It is expected that the captured EM will show identical modulated RF data except for the response packet, which should change.

Interval	Δt	RF Observation
0.00 ms - 0.78 ms	$0.78 \mathrm{\ ms}$	Command, terminal-to-card
0.78 ms - 2.72 ms	1.94 ms	Unmodulated carrier, no data
2.72 ms - 3.41 ms	0.69 ms	Response, card-to-terminal
3.41 ms -		Unmodulated carrier, no data

Table 4.5: Times, Communications Events in **simple1** Experiment

Table 4.5 summarizes the timing of communications in this experiment. To summarize the results:

- The command and response data are transmitted at the exact same times as **simple0** and have the same duration.
- Comparison of the modulated RF shows that the *response is different*, while the command is the same.

- This is expected, as only the response has changed, with everything else remaining the same as the base case.
- These results confirm correct observation of response packets. Taken together with the **simple0x** results, the EM triggering technique appears to show the correct command and response.

4.4 Random Number Generator (simple3)

In this experiment, the smart card is programmed to generate 2 bytes of random data. The **simple3** experiment keeps the same command and response as the base case. However, the applet code now performs a more complex operation: random number generation. The random number is computed before returning the response code. Because of this extra strenuous computation, it is expected that there will be a new significant time delay before the response from the contactless card is seen.

When this new applet is installed on the Java Card, it defines a random number generator object using:

RandomData.getInstance(RandomData.ALG_SECURE_RANDOM);

The Java Card reference describes this **ALG_SECURE_RANDOM** type as "cryptographically secure random number generation algorithms" as opposed to "pseudo-random number generation" [35]. The IC referenced by the JCOP30 card documentation also contains a "true low power random number generator in hardware" [29]. Although the specific implementation of the random number generator is proprietary, it can safely be assumed that the random number generator is hardware assisted and at least partially based on a physical process. For instance, it may combine a truly random component (seed generator) with a pseudorandom component (stretching the seed into a longer number). When the applet receives a command, it generates 2 bytes of random data using the instruction:

randgen.generateData(randbytes, (short)0, RAND_LEN);

Table 4.6 shows the communication time events for the card running the random number generator. For the first time since the base case, the duration of the unmodulated carrier changes and becomes much longer. The contactless card is now sending its response 21 ms after the start of the communication sequence (compared to 3 ms in the base case and previous experiments).

Interval	Δt	RF Observation
0.00 ms - 0.78 ms	$0.78 \mathrm{\ ms}$	Command, terminal-to-card
0.78 ms - 21.21 ms (varies)	20.43 ms (varies)	Unmodulated carrier, no data
21.21 ms - 21.90 ms	$0.69 \mathrm{ms}$	Response, card-to-terminal
21.90 ms -		Unmodulated carrier, no data

Table 4.6: Times, Communications Events in simple3 Experiment

On different trials of this experiment, the response modulation is seen at slightly different times. This is unlike the other experiments (including the next three) which always have precise times for communication events. The cryptographic random number generator may be non-deterministic, as would be expected for a non-pseudorandom generator based on a physical process. This would explain varying time delays in the applet. This is purely speculation, however. It could also be that the computation takes so much time that the Java Card OS interrupts the execution to perform other background tasks.

To summarize these results:

- The time duration of the command and response are the same. The only thing that has changed is the length of the interval where there is no unmodulated carrier.
- This is expected; only applet code, not the communication, was modified.
- The response no longer arrives at a fixed time, but shifts between trials of this experiment. The causes for this are unknown, but possible reasons are a non-deterministic random number generator and/or extra Java Card OS events due to particularly long applet run-time.
- The results of this experiment suggests that this period in between the command and response corresponds to the applet's processing time, supporting the processing model introduced in Section 3.1. The last 3 experiments aim to conclusively determine whether or not this is the case.

4.5 One Round of Transformation (simple4)

In this experiment, the smart card is programmed to execute a set of simple mathematical operations (add/multiply). The **simple4** experiment keeps the same command and response as the base case. The applet code, however, now performs one round of a short mathematical transformation. The constant MATH_ROUNDS = 1 in the following Java code:

```
// Iterations of mathematical operations
short rounds;
short x = 0xAA;
for (rounds=1; rounds <= MATH_ROUNDS; rounds++)
{
   short y = (short)(x * rounds);
   x = (short)(x + y);
}</pre>
```

This is a meaningless computation; the purpose is to perform some basic mathematical operations. When the card receives a command and executes these instructions, it is expected that there will be some extra delay before the response is returned (compared to the base case). Also, it is expected that the new time delay will be less than the **simple3** case which involves a lengthy random number generation.

Using knowledge of the processor on the smart card, it is possible to approximate the order of magnitude of the extra processing time. The P8RF5016 IC on the JCOP30 card uses the 80C51 CPU with configurable CPU clock speed [29]. Specific implementation details are not available in the non-proprietary short specification. Assuming an 8 MHz CPU clock and approximately 20 clock cycles per average instruction for the original Intel 8051, the average instruction executes in approximately $\frac{1 \text{ s}}{8 \cdot 10^6 \text{ cycles}} \times \frac{20 \text{ cycles}}{\text{instruction}} = 2.5 \ \mu\text{s}$

There are no implementation-specific details available on how the Java code from above is converted by the JCOP virtual machine to actual executable CPU instructions. One might approximate on the order of 30 CPU instructions at runtime after assembly, giving a run-time on the order of 100 μ s for the above code. This calculation is very rough.

Interval	Δt	RF Observation
0.00 ms - 0.78 ms	$0.78 \mathrm{\ ms}$	Command, terminal-to-card
0.78 ms - 3.06 ms	$2.28 \mathrm{\ ms}$	Unmodulated carrier, no data
3.06 ms - 3.75 ms	$0.69 \mathrm{\ ms}$	Response, card-to-terminal
3.75 ms -		Unmodulated carrier, no data

Table 4.7: Times, Communications Events in **simple4** Experiment

Table 4.7 shows the measured times of the communication events. There is a slight increase in the duration of the unmodulated carrier (2.28 ms) compared to the base case (1.94 ms). The response is delayed by 340 μ s, and this is on the same order as the rough approximation (100 μ s) for code execution time on the CPU.

To summarize these results:

- The command and response have the same durations and values as the base case.
- There is a slight $(340 \ \mu s)$ increase in the duration of the unmodulated carrier.
- Unlike **simple3**, this timing is constant on all trials. This may be due to a deterministic computation (mathematical algorithm) versus the non-deterministic cryptographic random number generator used in **simple3**.
- The results suggest, as with **simple3**, that the extra delay before the response is sent back is due to the new instructions being executed on the smart card. This correlation is strengthened by the fact that the increase in time delay in this experiment was on the same order as the expected code execution time, compared to a much longer time delay in the case of the random number generation experiment.

4.6 Two Rounds of Transformation (simple5)

The **simple5** experiment keeps the same command and response as the base case. The applet code now performs two rounds of the mathematical transformation from **simple4**. Another increase in the time delay before the response is expected.

Interval	Δt	RF Observation
$0.00~\mathrm{ms}$ - $0.78~\mathrm{ms}$	$0.78 \mathrm{\ ms}$	Command, terminal-to-card
0.78 ms - 3.27 ms	$2.49 \mathrm{\ ms}$	Unmodulated carrier, no data
3.27 ms - 3.96 ms	$0.69 \mathrm{\ ms}$	Response, card-to-terminal
3.96 ms -		Unmodulated carrier, no data

Table 4.8: Times, Communications Events in simple5 Experiment

Table 4.8 shows the measured times of the communication events. The unmodulated carrier duration has increased by another 210 μ s compared to the experiment with only one round of transformations.

To summarize these results:

- The command and response have the same durations and values as the base case.
- The response arrives 210 μ s later than in **simple4**, which had only 1 round of transformations.
- The timing is constant for every trial.
- The result shows that a slight increase instructions executed on-card corresponds to a slight increase in duration of the unmodulated carrier observed on the EM side-channel, before a response is sent by the card.

4.7 Three Rounds of Transformation (simple6)

The **simple6** experiment keeps the same command and response as the base case. The applet code now performs three rounds of the mathematical transformation from **simple4**. Another increase in the time delay before the response is expected.

Table 4.9 shows the measured times of the communication events. The unmodulated carrier duration has increased by another 210 μ s compared to the experiment with only two round of transformations.

To summarize these results:

Interval	Δt	RF Observation
0.00 ms - 0.78 ms	$0.78 \mathrm{\ ms}$	Command, terminal-to-card
0.78 ms - 3.48 ms	2.70 ms	Unmodulated carrier, no data
3.48 ms - 4.17 ms	$0.69 \mathrm{ms}$	Response, card-to-terminal
-		Unmodulated carrier, no data

Table 4.9: Times, Communications Events in simple6 Experiment

- The command and response have the same durations and values as the base case.
- The response arrives 210 μ s later than in **simple5**, which had only two rounds. This is in fact the same time increment as when the number of rounds was increased from one to two.
- The timing is constant for every trial.
- The results of this series of tests on the number of rounds shows a predictable correlation between the time shift as seen on the EM side-channel and the code processing on-card. Each extra round of transformations computed on the card results in an extra time delay of 210 μ s in the communication. A timing side-channel attack on this technology may be possible; see Section 5.2 for a discussion on the potential for an EM-based time side-channel attack.

4.8 Summary of Experiments

The series of test applets each yields a controlled, reproducible change in captured EM, either in command/response data (simple0x, simple1) or the duration of the "gap" between command and response (simple3, simple4, simple5, simple6). These experiments use the physical EM triggering method developed in Section 3.6, and the observations support the communication/processing model suggested in Figure 3.2 of Section 3.1. The experimental results suggest that the EM triggering

method can be used to monitor the card's side-channel, as discussed in the next section.

Table 4.10 summarizes the contactless Java Card experiments carried out. In all cases, the command duration is 0.78 ms and the response duration is 0.69 ms. The command and response have a fixed byte length in all experiments, resulting in the same number of modulated bits transmitted and therefore the same time duration. The "gap" duration, however, changes. In all cases except for the random number generator experiment, the measured times remain constant on all trials.

Applet executing on Java Card	Gap duration
Base Case, Reference (simple0)	1.94 ms (constant)
Modified Command (simple0x)	1.94 ms (constant)
Modified Response (simple1)	1.94 ms (constant)
Random Number Generator (simple3)	20 ms (varies)
One Round of Transformation (simple4)	2.28 ms (constant)
Two Rounds of Transformation (simple5)	2.49 ms (constant)
Three Rounds of Transformation (simple6)	2.70 ms (constant)

Table 4.10: Summary of Experiments and Gap Durations

Chapter 5

Discussion

The procedures for monitoring Java Card side-channels are developed to provide necessary techniques for conducting attacks, although an actual EM side-channel attack is not performed in this thesis. Sections 3.1 and 3.2 describe the technical difficulties surrounding a practical EM side-channel attack on a contactless Java Card.

Before a side-channel attack can be performed, there must be a reliable way to determine where in time the smart card's microprocessor is executing Java Card applet instructions. Procedures for dealing with contactless Java Card EM signals and ISO 14443 [21] communications are also required. In the absence of documented procedures for these purposes, Section 3 develops new techniques for measuring the required signals, and triggering test equipment at the proper times (see Section 3.6).

Using these new techniques and operating under an abstract model of applet execution as depicted in Figure 3.2, the experiments set out to apply the methods to physical Java Cards to see if the procedures work as intended. The results of some experiments reveal additional information about contactless Java Cards that may be useful from an EM side-channel attack perspective. The significance of these experimental results are described below.
5.1 Significance of Results

One of the first challenges in this contactless Java Card side-channel research was developing a technique to observe the RF communications which are the basis of contactless card operation. The first experiments (Sections 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3) validate the EM triggering method developed in Section 3.6 by demonstrating that modifying the command and response from within software has the anticipated effect on the captured EM signal. These experiments show that novel EM-based triggering technique introduced in this thesis does indeed work properly with the JCOP contactless smart card and software used in this thesis.

The rest of the experiments set out to test the abstract model of applet execution on contactless Java Cards, as depicted in Figure 3.2. These experiments (Sections 4.4, 4.5, 4.6, and 4.7) validate the timing and processing model and support the technique developed in this thesis for investigating side-channel attacks. These experiments demonstrate correct location of EM measurements in time, and relative communication and processing event times. From the results, it appears that this thesis has answered the questions of "where" and "when" an attacker should observe the EM side-channel in order to perform an attack.

Taken together, the experiments clearly show that passive EM measurements are sufficient to gain some knowledge of what the contactless Java Card is processing in an applet. In all experiments, the notable feature of the EM observation which varies is the duration of the "gap" (unmodulated carrier between command and response). The experiments have shown that this region of the EM capture corresponds to the smart card processor executing code, as suggested in the model introduced in Section 3.1.

There is a correlation between the duration of this gap and the instruction cycles being executed by the contactless smart card. This correlation may be direct or indirect, but it certainly exists. Table 5.1 summarizes the relationship between experimentally-observed gap duration and the Java Card applet being executed during the measurement. The timings marked 'constant' remained constant through all trials of the experiment, always appearing on the oscilloscope at the same point in time. The one timing which varied between trials is described in more detail in Section 4.4.

Applet executing on Java Card	Gap duration
Minimal applet, immediately returns response	1.94 ms (constant)
Applet runs 1 round of mathematical transformation	2.28 ms (constant)
Applet runs 2 rounds of mathematical transformation	2.49 ms (constant)
Applet runs 3 rounds of mathematical transformation	2.70 ms (constant)
Applet generates hardware-assisted random numbers	20 ms (varies)

Table 5.1: Applet on Java Card and Corresponding Gap Duration

From the perspective of launching a true (differential) EM analysis attack, these results are encouraging. If the smart card's CPU is executing applet code during this gap between modulated command and response, then this would be the proper time to measure the EM signals emanating from the processor. Since the smart card can only begin executing code after the command packet is received, and must finish execution before returning the result, it is clear that the CPU is executing the applet code somewhere within this gap. The correlation found from the experiments certainly supports this.

While this correlation between observed EM side-channel and applet processing may seem obvious and expected, the specific experimental results have some serious implications: hardware that exhibits the timing behaviour found in this thesis may be vulnerable to an EM-based time side-channel attack.

5.2 Timing Attack Implications

Besides validating the EM side-channel observation techniques introduced in this thesis, some of the experiments also imply the feasibility of an EM-based time sidechannel attack. In this kind of attack, the attacker measures the execution time of software on the smart card under different conditions and uses differences in run-time to draw conclusions about the system (such as a private key).

This can be demonstrated using the results from the experiments which perform different iterations of a mathematical transformation. In the experiments, three different applets perform one, two and three iterations of a simple mathematical transformation. The only difference between these applets is the termination condition in a **for** loop, which determines how many iterations to compute.

The results of the experiments show that each additional iteration results in an additional 210 μ s "gap" time delay, as described in Section 5.1. The relative processing times are depicted in Figure 5.1 from the perspective of the EM sidechannel observation. The "gap" times as measured from different experiments are marked above this timing diagram.



Figure 5.1: Possible Relative Processing Time of Java Card Routines

It is important to note that the results do not necessarily mean that each additional loop takes 210 μ s to compute; instead, each additional loop in this specific software causes a 210 μ s delay to appear in the side-channel before the response is returned by the smart cards. The loop overhead time of 130 μ s is inferred from the difference between the base case and the applet which performs a single loop. Also, it is not known (without having implementation details) what order the microprocessor executes these stages in. It is reasonable to assume that the microprocessor executes instructions in the standard order shown in this diagram, though other processing (such as operating system operations) likely occurs as well.

A timing attack could be carried out as follows, using an oversimplified hypothetical example. Imagine that an applet implements an algorithm which at one point must branch depending on the value of the least significant bit of a private key. One branch executes a series of mathematical instructions while the other branch skips these extra instructions, similar to the thesis experiment which varies loop iterations.

Even though the private key is securely stored inside the smart card, the attacker can now observe the time events at the EM side-channel and determine whether or not this branch was executed, depending on the "gap" duration. This reveals the least significant bit of the private key to the attacker. The key has been partially exposed, simplifying other attacks or at the very least reducing the potential key space for an exhaustive search by $\frac{1}{2}$.

The actual feasibility of such a timing attack depends on the algorithm's implementation. However, given that custom applications are routinely loaded onto Java Cards, it is likely that some weak implementation of a security algorithm will be vulnerable. The timing attack can also be combined with other existing attacks, such as reverse engineering of Java Card applets [38]. Using a combination of methods, an attacker may be able to first reverse engineer the applet's instructions and then use a timing attack to compromise private information. This illustrates why "security through obscurity" is insufficient security, even behind the tamper-resistant protection of a smart card.

5.3 Comparison to Previous Research

Although this thesis did not perform an actual microprocessor EM side-channel attack due to time constraints, it is still possible to compare the thesis contributions with previous work on smart cards and Java Cards. Investigations into true sidechannel attacks were obstructed by limitations of triggering accuracy and unknown aspects of target device behaviour. For example, it is not known whether the sample periods (as triggered) are accurate enough for EM side-channel analysis, and there was insufficient time to investigate EM signals to this level of precision. Furthermore, the complex virtual machine on the smart card makes side-channel analysis for this platform particularly challenging. Measurement methods developed in this thesis provide a certain level of trigger precision and alignment, but with insufficient time to examine the EM behaviour of the virtual machine, a complete side-channel attack could not be pursued. Despite these limitations, the testing environment and measurement techniques developed in this work can still be compared to past research. Techniques for monitoring the side-channel of contactless Java Cards using EM have not previously been publicly documented. This thesis contributes new experimental methods that can be applied to side-channel attacks for contactless Java Cards.

Previous research on Java Card attacks ([4, 7, 38]) do not document the physical measurement techniques required to apply such attacks to contactless cards, or indicate whether such attacks are even relevant to the contactless case. In this thesis, contactless cards are specifically targeted.

Leaving aside the Java Card technology, there is previous research on contactless device attacks ([12, 16, 23, 24]) but all of these require some sort of custom hardware. The custom devices used in the experiments range from simple low cost electronics which replicate the behaviour of simple RFID tags to fully functional contactless prototypes manufactured with the help of commercial smart card makers. Some researchers describe generic tools that can be used for these kinds of contactless experiments [2]. There have however been practical attacks on contactless smart cards carried out without custom hardware [3]. Still, such attacks target simpler, single-application smart cards that don't involve additional complications that exist with the Java Cards used in this thesis (see Section 3.2 for a description of these complications). The experimental platform developed in this thesis relies on well documented, open standards (Java Card [35], Open Platform [11], and ISO 14443 [21]). This combination is expected to be more research-friendly than past research based on private technologies. The work in this thesis does not require knowledge of proprietary technologies such as the Mifare, which dominate contactless smart card implementations [16].

In summary, this thesis presents several significant new contributions to the field that have not been addressed in past research:

- EM-based side-channel monitoring of contactless Java Cards. Previous contactless research did not target contactless Java Cards or other complex multi-application cards. [2, 3, 4, 16, 23, 38]
- Procedures for unmodified, original COTS hardware. Previous attacks used custom built hardware or required modification and tampering of hardware. [2, 3, 12, 13, 16, 23, 24]
- Fully documented research-friendly methods using only publicly documented standards. Past research was dominated by proprietary procedures and protocols, with undisclosed details of experimental setup. [3, 4]
- EM-based triggering method for ISO 14443 devices. The triggering method can be applied to other RFID devices that use this common protocol.
- Overall, the methods introduced in this work do not require knowledge of proprietary techniques, hardware, or protocols.

Chapter 6

Conclusion

This work succeeded in developing research-friendly test techniques that can be used with contactless Java Cards for EM-based side-channel analysis. The methods and procedures developed in Section 3 have proved to be usable in a practical environment, at least with the JCOP-type Java Cards used in this research. Throughout this investigation, only open standards were used and knowledge of proprietary hardware or software was not required.

To help monitor the EM side-channel of contactless Java Cards, a method to trigger a standard oscilloscope from an ISO 14443 [21] contactless signal was developed and tested on physical cards. Using this method, one can passively intercept data packets by observing EM signals while the smart card is processing input. For the first time, this research shows that it is possible to monitor the EM side-channel of a contactless Java Card using only a standard oscilloscope and unmodified commercial off-the-shelf equipment, without any card contact or custom hardware.

The series of experiments, originally meant to investigate smart card communications and confirm the validity of measurement techniques, quickly revealed some important relationships between observed EM signals and what the smart card is processing. This is not an EM side-channel analysis attack (since EM was not measured from the smart card processor), but a method of reading clues about a Java Card applet from its RF communications. Some of these findings strongly suggest that a timing side-channel attack is feasible.

The very fact that EM observations alone provide some insight into executed code is an important, novel finding. These EM signals can be observed passively from potentially great distances, possibly opening the door for many attack scenarios. While Java Cards were used in this work because of the convenience of programming them, it is not believed that these findings are limited to Java Cards by any means.

It remains to be seen whether EM side-channel analysis attacks, such as differential EMA (DEMA) attacks, are possible with contactless Java Cards. This thesis has shown that there is an observable correlation between the command/response gap (see Section 5.1) and the code being executed by the contactless card. If usable EM side-channel information can be measured during this time window, this thesis may play an important role leading to practical EM side-channel attacks on contactless Java Cards.

Further research is also required to investigate vulnerability of contactless cards to timing attacks. The environment for card configuration and EM measurement developed in this thesis may prove to be a useful contribution for future research in this new field.

The timing and communication model introduced in Section 3.1 is believed to be applicable to all ISO 14443 contactless smart cards. The technique for measuring communications and triggering by EM is believed to be applicable to all ISO 14443 RFID devices, although this thesis only experimented with Type A cards. While far more research is needed to investigate the extent of possible attacks, it is believed that the measurement techniques introduced in this thesis will be applicable to bank/payment cards and electronic passports which are ISO 14443 compliant.

6.1 Future Work

The EM-based triggering technique developed in Section 3.6 uses a simple condition to detect the presence of an ISO 14443 Type A [21] command signal. The trigger condition can be further refined, either using external digital hardware or built-in capabilities of the digital oscilloscope. A more sophisticated trigger signal can more selectively detect the start of the desired APDU command transmission, rather than detecting *any* command transmission as it currently does. (In the current form, many other ISO 14443 protocol instructions will be detected even though they do not mark the start of Java Card applet processing.) A simple refinement to improve the accuracy of the EM trigger would be to ignore short command transmissions and only trigger on commands that are longer than a predefined threshold; this would ensure that applet-specific APDUs are being observed.

Once triggering is further refined, the microprocessor on the Java Card should be closely inspected to see if there is an EM side-channel due to instruction execution. Due to time constraints, the EM measured in this thesis was not analysed to detect the presence of a microprocessor side-channel. Since no previous research existed on measuring signals from the contactless Java Card, much time was spent developing a suitable trigger for the new environment and refining it to become more precise. The experiments confirm that the side-channel measurements are correctly placed relative to each other in time, but the precision of the trigger with respect to microprocessor activity is still unknown. Until the trigger is made very accurate, EM side-channel measurements at high sample rates require the collection of an extremely large number of samples. Although the digital oscilloscope used in the experiments can store large numbers of samples, very high sample rates over even seemingly small time intervals can produce more data than can be accommodated.

The findings from this thesis describe where in time to hunt for this EM sidechannel (see Section 5.1). Other events besides CPU cycles which may generate EM emanations are (slower) EEPROM memory access or other data bus events. Detecting the side-channel may require selecting a different antenna (see Section 3.3) or appropriately shielding the device in order to detect the comparatively weak EM side-channel, which is normally overwhelmed by the far more powerful ISO 14443 carrier. Bandpass filtering or frequency-domain analysis may also be sufficient to detect the microprocessor EM side-channel. There has been much research on microprocessor side-channels and EM measurement techniques [1, 30].

If an EM side-channel relating to microprocessor activity is discovered, the next logical step is attempting to perform an actual differential EM analysis attack. A feasible differential EM side-channel attack on the contactless Java Card would be a significant finding. Important considerations for such an attack are:

- Does the attack work for only one target platform, or does it work on several different implementations of "Java Cards"?
- What countermeasures exist on the target device?
- Does the attack target the (DES/RSA/etc.) coprocessor?

Other attacks not involving the EM side-channel may be possible and should be investigated. This includes the timing side channel as described in Section 5.2. A combination of methods may give the best results.

The test and measurement methods developed in this thesis are not limited only to contactless Java Cards. A wide variety of bank/payment cards, electronic passports, and other RFID cards also use ISO 14443. Potential side-channel attacks for these important technologies should be thoroughly investigated as well.

Considering the growing importance of contactless smart cards and ISO 14443, attack countermeasures would be another important area for future research. Contactless smart card data packets are often unencrypted, as encryption is left to the application layer. Depending on the software developer's design, critical portions of data may be unprotected and easily visible (as demonstrated in Section 2.3). A recent demonstration on a European e-passport shows that this threat is not merely academic [15]. Therefore, countermeasures such as adding noise to the physical layer may be helpful in protecting communications [33].

Appendix A

Java Card Applet Source Code

```
package uw.minimal.simple0;
import javacard.framework.*;
public class Simple0 extends Applet {
       final static short MAGIC_VALUE = 0x2007;
final static byte VERIFY = (byte)0x20;
       public static void install(byte[] bArray, short bOffset, byte bLength) {
              new Simple0(bArray, bOffset, bLength);
       }
       private Simple0(byte[] bArray, short bOffset, byte bLength){
              register();
       }
       public boolean select() {
              return true;
       }
       public void process(APDU apdu) {
              byte[] buf = apdu.getBuffer();
              if (selectingApplet()) {
                     return;
              }
              switch (buf[IS07816.OFFSET_INS]) {
              case VERIFY:
                     verify(apdu);
                                  // recognize VERIFY instruction
                     return;
              default:
                     ISOException.throwIt(ISO7816.SW_INS_NOT_SUPPORTED);
              }
       }
       private void verify (APDU apdu) {
              byte[] buffer = apdu.getBuffer();
              apdu.setOutgoing();
             apdu.setOutgoingLength((byte)2);
Util.setShort(buffer, (short)0, MAGIC VALUE);
apdu.sendBytes((short)0, (short)2); /7 return MAGIC_VALUE
       }
}
```

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